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Proxy Functions and Inscrutability of Reference 
STEVEN L. REYNOLDS 
Quine's favorite argument for the inscrutability of reference relies on 
reinterpretation using proxy functions: 
A proxy function is any explicit one-to-one transformation, f, defined 
over the objects in our purported universe. By 'explicit' I mean that 
for any object x, specified in an acceptable notation, we can specify fx. 
Suppose now we shift our ontology by reinterpreting each of our pred- 
icates as true rather of the correlates fx of the objects x that it had been 
true of. Thus, where 'Px' originally meant that x was a P, we reinter- 
pret 'Px' as meaning that x is f of a P. Correspondingly for two-place 
predicates and higher ... We leave all the sentences as they were, letter 
for letter, merely reinterpreting. The observation sentences remain 
associated with the same sensory stimulations as before, and the logi- 
cal interconnections remain intact. Yet the objects of the theory have 
been supplanted as drastically as you please. ([12], pp. 31-2) 
The penultimate sentence rehearses Quine's account of the evidence for 
translation: it consists of sensory stimulations that would prompt 
utterance, or assent or dissent, and also observable relations to other 
sentences of the native language. Presumably the idea of the argument is 
that any evidence for reference must also be evidence for translation. If two 
interpretations are supported equally by all possible evidence for 
translation, they must also be supported equally by all possible evidence 
for reference. So if the proxy function and standard interpretations 
cannot be distinguished by the evidence for translation, reference is 
inscrutable. 
Quine tells us explicitly how to assign referents to subsentential 
expressions, but not how to find the corresponding sentence translations. 
Much of the literature on the proxy function argument assumes however 
that assignments of referents to subsentential expressions yield transla- 
tions of the containing sentences by way of a Davidsonian theory of 
truth/meaning (Wallace [2], Field [3], Davidson [1]). Quine endorses the 
project of producing such a theory,1 so it seems likely that he has it in 
mind for this purpose. The assignments of referents to expressions are 
axioms of the theory, and, together with the other axioms (syntax and 
1 '... it was left to Davidson to recognize Tarski's theory of truth as the very structure 
of a theory of meaning. This insight was a major advance in semantics.' (Quine [10] 
p. 38.) 
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projection rules), they allow the derivation of truth conditions for each 
sentence. The object language sentence is translated in the statement of 
its truth condition, and the theory is empirically supported to the extent 
that the translations thus produced are empirically acceptable. (If the 
meta-language includes the object language, empirically acceptable 
translations may be guaranteed by designing the theory to generate 
homophonic truth conditions.) 
A simple example will be useful later. Suppose we consider the sentence 
'London is foggy'. On the standard reference scheme 'London' refers to 
London, and 'is foggy' is true of x if and only if x is foggy. 'London' is a 
name, and 'is foggy' is a predicate. Suppose we also have the projection 
rule 'A sentence of the form Fa, where F is a predicate true of all and only 
G's, and a is a name that refers to b, is true if and only if Gb'. We can then 
derive "'London is foggy" is true if and only if London is foggy'. 'London 
is foggy' (now in the meta-language) is thus the standard translation of the 
object language sentence 'London is foggy'. 
Let f represent a proxy function that maps London to Mt. Everest, Mt. 
Everest to the moon, the moon to London, and everything else to itself 
(Kirk [5], p. 116). According to the new reference scheme 'London' refers 
to f(London) [i.e. Mt. Everest], and 'is foggy' is true of x if and only if the 
f-inverse of x is foggy. Using the above projection rule we can then derive 
"'London is foggy" is true if and only if f(London) is such that its f-inverse 
is foggy'. So the proxy function altered translation is 'f(London) is such 
that its f-inverse is foggy'. 
We obtain this translation if we change the reference scheme, as Quine 
requires, leaving the rest of the theory untouched. But there is evidence in 
Pursuit of Truth that Quine has in mind a different proxy function reinter- 
pretation. He says '... divergent interpretations of the words in a sentence 
can so offset one another as to sustain an identical translation of the 
sentence as a whole. It is what I have called inscrutability of reference ...' 
([12], p. 50). The above proxy function translation is obviously not an 
identical translation. 
John Wallace suggests obtaining identical translations by adding to the 
theory of truth/meaning an axiom characterizing the proxy function, thus 
allowing derivation of either homophonic (if the metalanguage contains 
the object language), or standard, truth conditions ([13], p. 155). I suppose 
Quine must have Wallace's amendment in mind, since there seems to be no 
other way to get homophonic (or standard) translations starting from a 
proxy function altered reference scheme. (If, in addition to changing the 
reference scheme, we were to change the projection rules or syntax of the 
theory to permit the desired deductions, it would be doubtful that the 
result indicated inscrutability of reference.) 
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But adding an axiom to a theory does not prevent any previously 
available deductions. So a Wallace-style reinterpretation yields two differ- 
ent statements of truth conditions for each sentence. For 'London is foggy' 
it yields as translations both 'London is foggy' and 'f(London) is such 
that its f-inverse is foggy'. This seems a disadvantage, but perhaps we 
could still regard it as empirically equivalent to the standard interpretation 
if the two translations were equally supported by the evidence for 
translation. 
So, although Quine intends his reinterpretation to result in homophonic 
translations, it will be empirically equivalent to the standard interpretation 
only if 'London is foggy' may be equally well translated by 'London is 
foggy' and by 'f(London) is such that its f-inverse is foggy'. Are these 
equally good translations, on Quine's own account of the evidence for 
translation? 
In radical translation of a new language, or in learning one's native 
language, according to Quine, the evidence consists of environmental 
effects on the utterances of those who already speak it: sensory stimula- 
tions of the speaker and the resulting utterances and assents or dissents. 
To learn a language is to learn to utter and accept its sentences under 
stimuli relevantly similar to those under which other speakers would utter 
or accept them. Good translation, on the other hand, matches sentences of 
the target language to sentences of a previously mastered language in a way 
that sufficiently preserves relevant stimulus-to-utterance patterns. At first 
one matches native sentences one has heard to sentences of one's own 
language that would be produced, assented to and dissented from in simi- 
lar circumstances, and then, gradually, one constructs a systematic way of 
finding sentences to match even those sentences of the native language one 
hasn't heard. 
The most important pieces of evidence, because most copiously availa- 
ble, are the stimulations that prompt assent to or dissent from a sentence. 
There has been a shift in Quine's characterization of this evidence. In Word 
and Object, observation sentences were to be translated, where possible, 
by matching them to sentences of similar stimulus meaning ([8], pp. 32- 
35). The stimulus meaning of a sentence consists of those activations of 
sensory receptors that would alter tendencies to assent to or dissent from 
the sentence. It seems however that translation should not be impeded by 
differences in the configuration of the sensory receptors, which makes it 
hard to characterize the relevant similarity of stimulus meaning. 
In response to this difficulty, in Pursuit of Truth, Quine claims instead 
that the translator should first seek sentences that would be assented to or 
dissented from in relevantly similar perceptual situations ([12], pp. 40-44). 
We are able to recognize similarity of perceptual situations, he says, 
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although we may often be unable to indicate precisely the relevant shared 
features. 
This characterization of the evidence for translation relaxes Quine's 
individualism. A perceptual situation, unlike a stimulus meaning, may 
include features of the environment beyond the subject's sensory receptors, 
such as the causes of their activation. I shall not discuss the familiar causal 
theory of reference objection to the proxy function argument however 
(Devitt [2], pp. 188-91; Kirk [5], pp. 116-27). Instead I shall raise an 
objection that applies to both of Quine's accounts of the evidence. 
Another important kind of evidence for translation is assent/dissent 
behaviour that indicates the logical relations of sentences. Quine uses such 
evidence to translate the truth functions ([8], pp. 57-61). Suppose that 
conjoining '&' with sentences A and B produces an acceptable sentence to 
which the native usually assents when, and only when, he assents to each 
of A and B separately. Then '&' should probably be translated as 'and', on 
the ground that 'and' plays a similar role in the translating language. Quine 
concedes that similar methods could be used to translate the quantifiers, 
though not to make the distinction between substitutional and objectual 
quantifiers ([9], pp. 314-15). 
When Quine claims that after proxy function reassignments 'the obser- 
vation sentences remain associated with the same sensory stimulations as 
before, and the logical interconnections remain intact', he is claiming that 
the proxy function and standard translations are equally acceptable on 
both of these sorts of evidence. But if we return to our example, I think we 
will see that the proxy function and standard translations are not equally 
supported by either kind of evidence. 
As to the first sort: There are possible stimulations that would cause me 
to dissent from 'Mt. Everest exists', and those same stimulations, coupled 
with the sorts of stimulations that would typically lead me to assent to 
'London is foggy', would leave me still assenting to 'London is foggy', 
while not assenting to 'f(London) is such that its f-inverse is foggy'. For I 
would then regard 'f(London)' as non-referring. In the terms of Quine's 
more recent account: there are perceptual situations in which I would 
assent to one of these translations but not the other. The two translations 
are not associated with the same sensory stimulations, so one may be a 
better match in this respect for the object language sentence. In our exam- 
ple the homophonic translation is better. 
This objection does not deny that the defined proxy function is a proxy 
function. It merely points out that the translator may have good (but 
misleading) evidence that it isn't. The translations share truth values, but 
they need not, for that reason alone, be associated with the same range of 
sensory stimulations or perceptual situations. 
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Putnam's device of defining the proxy function so as to guarantee like- 
ness of truth value in all possible worlds does not affect this point ([6], pp. 
217-18). Suppose we define the proxy function as above for any possible 
world in which London, Mt. Everest, and the Moon all exist, and let it be 
the identity function for all other worlds. Then the standard translation 
and the proxy function translation have the same truth value in all possi- 
ble worlds. They are necessarily equivalent. Suppose furthermore that I 
firmly believe this, as in fact I do. Still, if I received sufficient sensory 
evidence that Mt. Everest does not and never did exist and that London 
is foggy, I would then assent to 'London is foggy' but not to 'f(London) 
is the f-inverse of a foggy place'. For if I ceased to believe in Mt. Everest, 
I would cease to believe in the necessary equivalence of the two 
translations. 
It might be thought that Quine's argument needs only a small amend- 
ment to prevent the possibility of misleading evidence of nonexistence. The 
example shows however that a guarantee of likeness in truth values, even 
a known and properly appreciated guarantee, does not necessarily result in 
similar associations with sensory stimulations. If a guarantee of similar 
truth values does not yield similar associations with sensory stimulations, 
why should we expect that a guaranteed likeness in truth values plus a 
device to rule out evidence of non-existence will yield similar associations 
with sensory stimulations? 
A philosopher without Quine's other commitments might answer this 
question by saying that, if we can argue from the truth (or falsity) of the 
standard translation to the truth (or falsity) of a proxy function translation 
using only mathematical or logical premisses, the two translations should 
be regarded as having the same empirical content. Mathematics adds no 
empirical content. In the example, the argument from the truth of the 
standard translation to the truth of the proxy function translation presup- 
poses the existence of Mt. Everest. Eliminate this empirical contamination, 
and we should expect the translations to have the same associations to 
sensory stimulation, since there would be an a priori argument from one 
to the other. 
As a matter of fact, learning mathematics does tend to alter the sensory 
stimulations to which we respond by assenting to other sentences. So why 
should we regard mathematics as lacking in empirical content, rather than, 
with Quine, regarding it as having empirical content in virtue of its role in 
(undoubtedly) empirical theories? Quine would not adopt the analytic/ 
synthetic distinction, in the objectionable (to him) form of lacking/having 
empirical content, just to save the proxy function argument. 
My objection seems to depend on the epistemic possibility that a singu- 
lar term in the proxy function translation fails to refer. But Quine 
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eliminates singular terms from his canonical language for science, replac- 
ing them with constructions involving quantifiers, variables, and (often 
contrived) predicates. Can the objection be avoided by requiring that the 
translations be made into Quinean canonical languages? 
It is easy to see that this won't do it. Under the sensory conditions in 
which I would not assent to sentences containing 'f(London)', I would also 
not assent to sentences that entail that something uniquely f(London)-izes.2 
One might try to evade the objection by requiring that the proxy func- 
tion switches of referents always take objects to objects that are 
unavoidably believed to be necessary existents, say, numbers. We might use 
a proxy function that takes London to the number 1, Mt. Everest to 2, the 
Moon to 3, each natural number n to n+3, and everything else to itself. But, 
as we have noted, Quine does not hold that mathematics lacks empirical 
content: sufficiently recalcitrant sensory experience might lead us to 
change any of our judgments, including, perhaps, as a last resort, our 
mathematical judgments ([8], pp. 12-13). Exposure to philosophical argu- 
ment might also undermine belief in numbers (Field, [4]). Furthermore, 
even supposing that the modified argument works, its conclusion must 
sound weak to all but the most Platonically inclined. Instead of concluding 
that, when I use 'London', I could be referring to anything, as in the orig- 
inal argument, the amended argument concludes that either I refer to 
London or I refer to some object whose existence no possible experience 
can properly cause me to doubt. 
Another promising amendment is to require a conditional definition of 
the proxy function. So f(London) is Mt. Everest, if Mt. Everest exists, but 
it is London otherwise. Since Mt. Everest does exist the proxy function 
translation will treat object language occurrences of 'London' as referring 
to Mt. Everest. But should the translator come to believe Mt. Everest 
doesn't exist, she will then think that 'f(London)' refers to London, and so 
she will still assent to 'f(London) is such that its f-inverse is foggy'. 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that this device or some other 
produces sentences that are assented to or dissented from under the same 
stimulations as the standard translations. Even if some proxy function 
translations pass this test, they will still not be equivalent to the standard 
translation on Quine's other kind of evidence for translation. From 
'London is foggy' I am wont to infer that something is London and some- 
thing is foggy. From 'f-If(London) is foggy', on the other hand, I am wont 
2 'A word now about reparsing singular terms as general terms. When I have urged that 
course for certain purposes, I have suggested that any presumption of existence and 
uniqueness that had been regarded as intrinsic to the singular terms might be 
regarded thereafter as intrinsic to the corresponding eneral terms.' (Quine [11], p. 
114) 
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to infer that something is f-'f(London), that something is f(London), that 
something is London, and that something is foggy. The proxy function 
translation is richer in available existential inferences than is the standard 
translation. 
So it seems that, contrary to Quine's assertion, the logical interconnec- 
tions do not remain intact on the proxy function translation. The proxy 
function translation, but not the standard translation, has logical intercon- 
nections that do not appear for the object language sentence. 
It might be argued that these latter sorts of mismatch have nothing to do 
with reference, for they would occur even if the proxy function were 
defined as the identity function.3 The referents assigned would then be the 
same as on the standard interpretation, yet there would be mismatches in 
the logical relations to other sentences. 
But the argument claimed that all evidence for reference is evidence for 
translation, and it tried to show that the rival schemes are equally well 
supported by the evidence for reference by showing that they are equally 
well supported by the evidence for translation. Although failure to 
match on logical interconnections doesn't show that there is something 
wrong with the reference scheme, it does obstruct the intended argu- 
ment. Since the alternative translations are not equally supported, it 
does not follow that the different referential assignments are equally 
supported. 
To make the argument work it now appears to be necessary to show how 
to draw a distinction between evidence for translation and evidence for 
reference, and to show that the logical interconnections just described are 
not evidence for reference (even when rival reference schemes cannot be 
assigned without failures in translation). But then there appears to be a 
conflict with Quine's often reiterated view that the sentence, and not any 
subsentential expression, is the smallest unit of language that has any 
direct connection to the evidence. 
Finally it is necessary to say something about Putnam-style responses 
to objections to the proxy function argument. They offer a proxy 
function reinterpretation of the objection, or of selected predicates used 
in it (Putnam, [6], p. 36; [7], pp. 112-13). In giving the proxy function 
argument, Quine tries to persuade us to give up the traditional view of 
reference. To succeed he must argue from premisses acceptable to us. We 
do not at present regard proxy function reinterpretations as equally 
acceptable with the standard interpretation. So to offer to reinterpret 
objections with a proxy function is to abandon the attempt at 
persuasion. 
3 This suggestion is due to Alexander George. 
PROXY FUNCTIONS AND INSCRUTABILITY OF REFERENCE 2-3 5 
Quine might offer such reinterpretations if he aimed only to repel argu- 
ments against the indeterminacy thesis. As persuasion to give up the 
traditional view of reference however, the proxy function argument fails.4 
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